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The Internet's rise in popularity as a means for conducting transactions
and facilitating communications raises new issues and concerns for
participants in both cyberspace and dispute resolution. This Symposium
takes advantage of expertise from both fields, bringing together specialists in
these areas to explore means for resolving disputes both in cyberspace and
by utilizing cyberspace innovations.
David Brin begins this Symposium with great optimism about the
Internet's potential as a mechanism for resolving society's problems.' He
cites "four marvels of our age-science, democracy, the justice system, and
fair markets"-that have "nourished much of our unprecedented wealth and
freedom."2 Then he contends that "the Internet has potential for creating a
fifth great arena, equal to the others." 3 For the Internet to achieve this
greatness, Brin argues, a competitive process must emerge that separates the
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1 See generally David Brin, Disputation Arenas: Harnessing Conflict and
Competitiveness for Society's Benefit, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. REsOL. 597 (2000).
2 Id. at 601 (emphasis omitted). Brin's characterization of these four "marvels" finds
support in the work of other insightful analysts. See generally, e.g., NATHAN ROSENBERG
& L.E. BIRDZELL, JR., How THE WEST GREW RICH: THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF
THE WESTERN WORLD (1986). It surely would be rejected, however, by those who
associate liberalism, capitalism, and science with white male oppression of women and
people of color. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL
REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAw (1997) (critiquing these
radical feminists and multiculturalists).
3 Brin, supra note 1, at 601.
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good from the bad. The other four arenas accomplish this through the
following mechanisms: (1) peer review among scientists, (2) elections for
political office, (3) argument and evidence in litigation, and (4) consumer
choice in markets. These four processes, each in a roughly Darwinian way,
ensure a constant struggle among people, ideas, and things that preserves the
good while winnowing out the bad. The Internet currently lacks an
analogous process.
Brin's proposal for such a process on the Internet is both plausible and
attractive. Brin's proposal is a "disputation arena," a forum for testing and
challenging proposed visions or models of the world.5 Ultimately, the
disputation arena amounts to something like an old-fashioned debating
society. It will be quite good for debating the merits of, say, Tolstoy's
writing versus that of Dostoevsky, or the Beatles' music versus that of the
Rolling Stones. It even may be a useful forum for debating the merits of
public policy questions, like gun control.6 But these are the not the only sorts
of disputes that may arise. An entirely different sort of dispute is most
familiar to lawyers: X claims that Y breached a duty owed to X so X seeks
some remedy, such as money from Y. Brin has little to say about these sorts
of disputes. As Joseph Stulberg observes, Brin's proposal "suggests an arena
not so much of dispute resolution as active education.",7 Indeed, Brin
concedes that his proposal does not "offer explicit results."8
Explicit results are produced by adjudication, whether governmental
(litigation) or private (arbitration), and by negotiated and mediated
agreements. Three processes of dispute resolution-arbitration, negotiation,
and mediation-are the Big Three of alternative dispute resolution.9 They
assist in the resolution of massive numbers of disputes, day-in-day-out, year-
in-year-out. They are the workhorses. How can we best adapt them to the
new technology of cyberspace? That is the topic of the remaining
contributions to this Symposium.
4 See id. at 602.
5 Id. at 605-09.
6 See id. at 610.
7 Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediation, Democracy, and Cyberspace, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 617, 635 (2000); cf. Stulberg, supra, at 632-34 (defining "dispute").
8 Brin, supra note 1, at 614.
9 For example, they receive the lion's share of attention from the major dispute
resolution casebooks. See generally, e.g., EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ADVOCATE'S PERSPECTIVE (1997); STEPHEN B.
GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER
PROCESSES (3d ed. 1998); JOHN S. MURRAY Er AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(2d ed. 1996); LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND




Arbitration is just starting to move online, so Paul D. Carrington1° and
Henry H. Perritt, Jr." are less able to describe how virtual arbitration does
work than how it might work. In separate articles, Carrington and Perritt
each make a persuasive case that much of the time and expense of arbitration
could be saved through the use of cyber technology. Pleadings will be served
and filed electronically. While some tangible evidence may have to be seen
in person, other evidence does not. "The simplest technologies, e-mail
exchanges and web-based discussion spaces, can be used when written
statements by witnesses are sufficient. They also are sufficient for textual
documentary evidence .... ,,'2 For depositions, "[t]he party calling a witness
will prepare a direct examination on videotape and send a print to the
adversary. When the adversary is prepared to do so, he may conduct a cross-
examination .... ,13 Videoconferencing replaces travel. Evidence will be
submitted electronically to the arbitrator who then examines it. 14 If a hearing
is deemed necessary, it also will be conducted by videoconference.1
5
While Carrington envisions this process as "virtual arbitration," his ideas
and Perritt's might apply equally to litigation. It will not surprise us,
however, if litigation adopts this technology more slowly than arbitration
does. As Carrington suggests, international commercial arbitration seems
particularly well-suited to cyberspace. 16
Perritt focuses on the one-shot consumer transaction involving a small
dollar amount rather than on the large international arbitration between
repeat players. 17 Perhaps for this reason, he suggests that the "purported
benefit of online arbitration is modest."18 He is more encouraged by the
model of credit card chargebacks through which credit card issuers
investigate cardholder claims of billing errors. 19 The method used to resolve
challenged billing errors is successful for the following reasons: (1) it is
10 See generally Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Arbitration, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 669 (2000).
11 See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand
for New Forms of ADR, 15 OHIo ST. J. ON DISP. RFsOL. 675 (2000).
12 Id. at 680.
13 Carrington, supra note 10, at 669.
14 See id at 670.
15 See id.
16See id. at 672.
17 See Perritt, supra note 11, at 676-77.
18 Id. at 688.
19 See id. at 689-94.
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"cheap, easily accessible, and quick"; (2) it gives the consumer "leverage"
against the merchant; and (3) it does not require the consumer to "find a
lawyer or a third-party dispute resolution forum" because the adjudicator, so
to speak, is the credit card issuer.20 Perritt suggests this model to "designers
of online dispute resolution systems."'21 Following the logic of Perritt's view,
then, it may be that traditional dispute resolution mechanisms cannot be
utilized on the Internet without adaptation for the unique nature of the
forum.
III. NEGOTIATION
Negotiation survives and, in fact, thrives on technological change.
People originally negotiated in person. Then they negotiated by mail, and
then telegram, and then telephone. It will surprise no one that people are now
using the Internet to negotiate resolutions of their disputes. Sending an e-
mail is not fundamentally different from sending a letter, only faster.
But some envision the Internet as a means to transform more profoundly
the negotiation of disputes. For example, Ernest Thiessen and Joseph P.
McMahon, Jr. contend that "[c]yberspace and sophisticated computer
technology are presenting new opportunities for overcoming the challenges
of conventional negotiation .... ,,2 To that end, Thiessen and McMahon tout
"a new product and negotiation process called 'One Accord.'"3
A central purpose of One Accord is to provide a neutral site that obtains
each side's confidential information about interests, priorities, and best
alternatives to negotiated agreements. 24 Once One Accord obtains this
information from both parties, it combines the information to generate
settlement terms better for both parties than other settlement terms.2 This, of
course, is what mediators long have attempted to assist parties in
accomplishing. And it is fair to say that One Accord's software is not
negotiation software, but mediation software. One Accord is a mediator or,
as Thiessen and McMahon call it, a "neutral facilitator., 26 It would not be
accurate, however, to dismiss One Accord as merely mediation with some
20 Id. at 692.
21 Id. at 691.
22 Ernest M. Thiessen & Joseph P. McMahon, Jr., Beyond Win-Win in Cyberspace,
15 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 643, 643 (2000).
23 Id.
24 See id. at 647-48.
25 See id. at 648.




high-tech jargon. One Accord takes the foundation of mediation and then
adds to it both analytical rigor and technological power.
Few mediators without software like One Accord's have the capacity to
quantify precisely party preferences and so consistently push parties toward
their best agreement. And One Accord uses computers to store and
manipulate data with speed and accuracy unknown to a mediator using only
her head and a pad of paper. In short, One Accord seems like a promising
way to convert abstract theory about "efficiency frontiers" and the like into
agreements that actually might be better for the parties than what they
otherwise would reach through negotiation.
IV. MEDIATION
Mediation on the Internet is also the subject of contributions by Bruce
Leonard Bea 27 and by the group of Ethan Katsh, Janet Rifkin, and Alan
Gaitenby.
28
Beal is the "Internet Neutral," providing "the world's first wholly online
mediation service." 29 Despite this, and in contrast to Thiessen and
McMahon, Beal concedes that pure online mediation is still ahead of its
time. "Businesspersons have not yet accepted mediation negotiations by e-
mail, Internet chat rooms, and the like."30 Videoconferencing, by contrast, is
Beal's preferred technology for effective mediation. Beal argues that
"[o]nline mediation will not manifest fully until videoconferencing becomes
commonplace and the following apply: (1) video cameras and microphones
are built into computers; (2) videoconferencing software is bundled with
computers; and (3) modems are fast enough (i.e., 'broadband' or 512
kilobytes per second and greater) to accommodate videoconferencing. '" 31
Katsh and his coauthors also endorse videoconferencing as an "obvious
solution to the lack of face-to-face encounters" in Internet mediation.32 The
views of Beal and of Katsh, Rifkin, and Gaitenby provide a nice contrast to
the views of Thiessen and McMahon. Beal emphasizes videoconferencing
27 See generally Bruce Leonard Beal, Online Mediation: Has Its Time Come?, 15
01O ST. J. ON DIsP. REsOL. 735 (2000).
2 8 See generally Ethan Katsh et al., E-Commerce, E-Disputes, and E-Dispute
Resolution: In the Shadow of "eBay Law," 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. REsOL. 705 (2000).
2 9 Beal, supra note 27, at 736.
30 Id. at 737. In some contrast, Katsh and his coauthors' eBay mediation project
relied "almost exclusively" on e-mail and apparently was quite successful. See Katsh et
al., supra note 28, at 710.
31 Beal, supra note 27, at 736.
32 Katsh et al., supra note 28, at 718.
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because Beal is especially concerned about the mediator's ability to
demonstrate a "serious demeanor, professional presentation, occasional
humor, and just plain charisma., 33 Similarly, Katsh, Rifkin, and Gaitenby
worry that the e-mail medium gives the mediator "difficulty using the
intuitive cues of body language, facial expression, and verbal tonality that
are part of face-to-face mediation processes." 34 In contrast, Thiessen and
McMahon seem to place less weight on these factors and more weight on the
rational, technocratic side of approaching "efficiency frontier[s].'
Katsh, Rifkin, and Gaitenby engaged in a pilot mediation project for
eBay, the largest online auction site on the Web.36 While their article
discussing this project makes many fascinating points, we will address only
one. Katsh and his coauthors "postulate that it is the nature of 'eBay law,'
the law of the individual online marketplace, that may shape opportunities
for online ADR in the future .... 37 What they mean by "eBay law" is best
explained with an example. They suggest that "the most significant statistic"
generated in their pilot project is the large number of eBay users willing to
participate in their mediation process.38
Why would most eBay users be willing to participate with us? Whether
or not they actually wished to reach a mutually acceptable outcome, they
typically had concerns about further participation and involvement in eBay
and about how the dispute might affect their future in eBay. EBay was
important to them, and eBay ran its site in such a way that a user's eBay
future could be affected by disputes that arose. If they ignored eBay law,
they did so at some risk to their future online life and even to their economic
well-being.
39
33 Beal, supra note 27, at 737.
34 Katsh et al., supra note 28, at 714; accord Stulberg, supra note 7, at 638-40
(discussing various media of communication).
35 Thiessen & McMahon, supra note 22, at 646.
36 See Katsh et al., supra note 28, at 707.
37 Id. at 708.
3 8 Id. at 728.
39 Id. This is an example of the general point that agreements are enforced not only
by courts but by private sanctions such as boycott. See generally David Charny, Nonlegal
Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1990). Private
sanctions are especially important with respect to agreements to arbitrate. See Bruce L.
Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modem Arbitration Statutes on the
Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 490 (1995);
Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of
Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L.
REV. 449, 473 (1996); see also Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
[Vol. 15:3 2000]
INTRODUCTION
In short, Katsh, Rifkin, and Gaitenby suggest that eBay mediation occurs
"in the shadow of' eBay law. ° EBay and other online marketplaces
promulgate their own private law, or "rule-sets,' 41 "that users can choose to
join or not.'42
This is exciting. As David Post argues, "our ability to move unhindered
into and out of these individual networks with their distinct rule-sets ... is a
powerful guarantee that the resulting distribution of rules is a just
one .... ,43 Post suggests that "our very conception of what constitutes
justice may change as we observe the kind of law that emerges from
uncoerced individual choice."" Through this process, the Internet may be a
truly liberating force.
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 149
(1992). Bernstein observes that
[u]nlike a court, the [New York Diamond Dealers Club arbitrator] has the ability to
bring unique pressures on the losing party to pay: it can put him out of business
almost instantaneously by hanging his picture in the clubroom of every bourse in the
world with a notice that he failed to pay his debt.
Id.
40 Katsh et al., supra note 28, at 727.
41 Id. at 732 (citing David Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 155,
167 (1997)).
42 Id
'43 Post, supra note 41, at 167, quoted in Katsh et al., supra note 28, at 732.
44 Id., quoted in Katsh et al., supra note 28, at 732. One of us has made that
argument with respect to the choice among competing systems of private law offline. See
Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Assimilation, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. (forthcoming 2000);
Stephen I. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703,744-47 (1999).

